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Beyond the

Massachusetts

Party-Group

Interest

Continuum

in

Groups

the 1980s

John C. Berg

Studies in the 1960s determined that Massachusetts
groups. In the 1970s

and

declined, conflict with the

importance

had strong parties and weak

interest

1980s, as the Republican Party shrank, party competition

Democratic Party grew, and interest groups gained more
will remain important despite the Republican gains of

— and probably

and citizen mobilization, including increased use of the
and referendum, create a situation of interest-centered conflict rather than
interest-group dominance as traditionally conceived. This article, based on a 1987
survey of state legislators and legislative aides, plus a summary of recent Massachusetts
political history, assesses the relative importance of various types of groups and ofpartic1990. However, group conflict

initiative

ular organizations.

Studies of state interest-group politics by V.

O. Key,

Jr.,

Sarah McCally More-

house, and others posit an inverse relationship between the strength of groups
1

and the strength of political parties. In one sense, such a relationship is logically
necessary; if parties dominate politics, groups cannot, and vice versa. Morehouse
rightly distinguishes between states in which groups can act only through the parties
and those in which powerful groups can ignore the parties, offering the domination
of Alabama by the Farm Bureau as a classic example of the latter. 2 Studies of Massachusetts interest groups in the 1950s and 1960s accepted this relationship and clas3
sified the state as having a strong two-party system with weak groups. However, the
most recent of these studies was published in 1969; Morehouse's later book simply
reports the conclusions of the earlier studies.

Great changes

in the last

two decades have moved Massachusetts closer to the

interest-group end of the interest-group/political-party dominance scale. However,

movement along this scale does not convey the whole picture. While
now much stronger than the parties, they do not dominate
Massachusetts politics. They are kept from doing so not by the parties, but by inter-

I

believe that

the interest groups are

group

conflict.

The most dramatic change
cratic Party

dominance of the

houses for the

John C. Berg

is

first

in

Massachusetts politics has been the

legislature.

The Democrats won

time ever in 1958 and have not lost

professor of government at Suffolk University.

61

it

rise in

Demo-

control of both

since. In the

1976 election,
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Senate dropped below the level needed (8 memand continued to hover just above or below this line
4
until 1990. During the 1980s the Republicans failed to contest most seats. If every
Republican candidate in the 1986 election had won (and only 58 percent of them
did), the Democrats would still have retained control of both houses by virtue of the

Republican numbers

in the state

bers) to force a roll call vote

114 uncontested

seats.

(See Table

for a

1

summary

of this election for the House.)

Table 1

Party Competition
Election,

1986

in

Massachusetts Legislative

— House of Representatives

Party

Contest with

Contest

Independent

Urn opposed

Seats

Democrat

23

11

92

126

Republican

14

3

16

33

—

—

Party Affiliation

of

Winning Candidate

Independent

1

Source: Calculated from Massachusetts Election

Although Ronald Reagan carried the

Statistics, 1986, sec.

state in

Total

1

133 198-357.
,

both 1980 and 1984, Republicans

did not win any statewide or federal elected office between the election of Senator

Edward Brooke

in

1972 and that of Governor William Weld, Lieutenant Governor

Paul Cellucci, and Treasurer Joseph Malone in 1990. During that time the question
often was not whether the Republicans would win, but whether they would

manage

two Republican candidates for governor withthe face of scandal and the Republicans failed to contest 7 of

to field candidates. In 1986, the first

drew from the ballot in
the 10 Democratic seats

in the U.S.

House of Representatives,

6 of the 8 seats in the

all-Democratic Executive Council, 22 of the 29 Democratic seats in the state Senate,
5

and 103 of the 126 Democratic seats in the House of Representatives.
As might be expected, one result of the two decades of Democratic prosperity
was the loss of whatever internal coherence the party might have had. Massachusetts
developed an electoral pattern similar to that of the one-party South. In both the
state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives, the renomination of incumbents was rarely challenged; but when a vacancy occurred, there was a mad primary
scramble among as many as six candidates. The primary winner
often with far
less than a majority of the vote
then faced only token or no opposition from the
Republicans and was generally able to retain the seat for as long as he or she chose.
(A similar pattern prevailed among the Republicans in the few strongholds they
retained through the 1980s.) 6 The preprimary endorsement conventions for statewide offices do little to strengthen the parties, since any candidate who gets as
much as 15 percent of the delegate vote can and does go on to the primary.
Things changed dramatically in 1990. Taking advantage of a state budget crisis,
the Republicans won the elections for governor, lieutenant governor, and state treasurer. Led by its aggressive chairman, Ray Shamie, the Republican State Committee increased its paid staff to 28 and recruited legislative candidates energetically.
Republicans contested 37 of the 40 state Senate seats and won 16, doubling their
strength in that body. Having won 38 House seats, they seem determined to bring

—

—
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7

two-party competition back to Massachusetts. However, the Democrats continue

dominate the state legislature, hold all 11 (soon to be reduced) seats in the U.S.
House and both U.S. Senate seats, and tend to dismiss the 1990 Republican victories
as a fluke. Republicans John Volpe and Francis Sargent held the governor's office
from 1967 to 1974 without seriously threatening Democratic dominance of the state,
and many Democratic legislators hope that Weld's term will meet the same fate.
Events may prove them wrong; but so far the Republican gains have had little effect
on the modus operandi of the Democratic Party policymakers.
Individual Democratic politicians may have strong organizations, but these are
purely personal. Such organizations work hard for their leader but have little or
no effect on nominations for other offices. This is especially true in the downward
direction: a local official may call on his or her troops to work for a gubernatorial
candidate, but any attempt by a governor to influence the outcome of a local primary contest is likely to be deeply resented and counterproductive. Thus Governor Michael Dukakis, who possessed one of the strongest personal organizations
of any Massachusetts politician, chose to stay out of contests for lieutenant governor in 1982 and 1986, even though he subsequently had to run on a joint ticket
to

with the victor.

Although the absence of a strong Democratic Party organization might lead to a
it does not, because power in the General Court is highly centralized in the hands of the Senate president and the House speaker. The two presiding
officers are chosen by majority vote of the members of their respective chambers,
but once elected, each possesses a multitude of resources for consolidating his (or
potentially, her) power. Unlike the U.S. Congress, the Massachusetts General Court
has no seniority system. Committee memberships and chairmanships, office space,
furniture, additional staff support beyond the one aide to which each member is
entitled, patronage jobs in the State House, and even parking space in the state
garages are all under the control of the presiding officers. Legislative leaders also
chaotic legislature,

control significant patronage in the state's executive branch, because another of the
peculiarities of the state's constitution permits the legislature to define the terms of
office

— including terms for

life

— of

The

all

executive officials other than judges and

must both authorize posiand permit them to be filled. 8 Until 1967, governors often were unable to
choose their own major department heads. 9
The privileges and positions of legislators can be conferred or withdrawn by the
leadership at any time. Moreover, many top positions carry salary increments, so
that members' pocketbooks as well as their power depend on the leaders' will.
Those who wield this power too strongly risk being deposed by the membership,
as in 1985, when Speaker Thomas McGee was ousted by George Keverian. But
challenges to sitting leaders are rare, so they have a good deal of leeway in legelected constitutional officers.

legislature generally

tions

islative matters.

Since the Democrats held both the governorship and the two legislative leader-

from 1975 to 1991, strong party coordination of policy might have
But in practice, the Democrats' numerical strength was so great that
much of the pressure for unity was removed, and disputes among the three powerful
Democrats were brought center stage. While the capture of the governor's office by
Republican Weld has created more pressure for Democratic unity, Senate president
ship positions

been

possible.
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William Bulger and House speaker Charles Flaherty have not always succeeded
overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of the 1980s.
In a study published in 1981, Doyle and Milburn found that
because of the fluid party organizational structures within most of the
land states, the general influence on governmental policy in

in

New Eng-

comes
from organized interests. Factions appear within the parties of the legislatures
and from one gubernatorial officer (often of the same party) to another. 10

One might question whether

all six

states

the divisions within the party today constitute "factions,"

but the incoherence of the Democratic Party on policy questions remains.

The way is

clear for the influence of interest groups.

The Current Interest-Group Scene
To discover what legislators and legislative staff thought about various interest
groups, I drew up a survey and sent forms to every member of the legislature in the
fall of 1987. 1 asked the members to fill out one copy themselves and give another
one to a staff aide. I received replies from 42 of the 200 legislators and from 36 staff
members. This response rate is not high enough to show significant patterns through
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the responses were suggestive in some areas. While
it is possible that some important groups were not mentioned by the respondents,
we can fairly conclude that any group that was mentioned frequently has some
importance. The survey form requested information about the activity and influence
of

six

types of interest groups: business groups, professional groups, labor, grassroots

community groups,

religious groups,

and women's groups. Respondents were asked

about the activity and influence of each category of group, then asked to identify the

were most important.
Respondents were also asked to rate the seven types of groups separately by three
different criteria: how often they heard from each type; how likely their own vote (or
their boss's, in the case of aides) was to be influenced by that type of group; and how
much influence that type of group had on the outcome of legislation. The responses
were averaged, and interest-group types ranked, as shown in Table 2.
particular groups in each category they thought

Table 2

Composite Rankings of Interest-Group Influence
Frequency of

Influence on

Contact

Persona Vote
Aide
Legislator

Type of

Group

I

Legislator

Aide

4

5

3

2

1

5

3
2

Labor
Business
Environmentalist
Grassroots citizens
Professional

Women's
Religious
Source: Calculated from

1

3
5
6
7

my

survey,

Influence on
of Lee lislation

Outcome

Legislator

Aideftie!

6

1

1/2

2

1/2

1

5
2

2

1

5
3

4
6

6
4

3
4

7

7

7

3
4
5
6
7

November-December

4
6
7

1987.

These figures show a certain amount of cynicism on the part of the respondents;
own votes are most influenced by environmentalist and grassroots citizens groups, they perceive business and labor as having the most influence on leg-

while their
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respondents see themselves as more responsive than the
women's groups. This may show that the sample is unrepresentative; proportionately more women than men responded. (Twelve female and 26
male legislators filled out questionnaires; in 1987, 37 of the 200 members were
female.) But it may also represent a recognition of what one respondent wrote on
the questionnaire: "Most high-powered lobby efforts are really geared toward the
House speaker, Senate president, and a few key committee chairmen because the
rank and file legislators rarely vote against what these people say."
Table 3 shows the specific groups most often mentioned by both legislators and
staff members in response to a request to list by name "the most powerful [groups]
islative decisions. Similarly,

legislature as a

whole

to

Massachusetts."

in

Table 3

Legislative

and Staff Mentions of the Most
in Massachusetts

Powerful Groups
Group

Legislator

Staff

12
12

7

Associated Industries of Massachusetts
Citizens for Limited Taxation
Insurance industry
Massachusetts Teachers Association

12

AFL-CIO
Massachusetts Hospital Association
Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts
Massachusetts Bar Association
Massachusetts High Tech Council
Massachusetts Municipal Association
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group
Gun Owners Action League
League of Women Voters

Chamber

of

7
6
7
5
6
3
3
2
3
5
2
3
3

11

8
6
6
5

4
7

4
4
1

Commerce

Massachusetts Medical Society
Source: Calculated from

my

survey,

4

1

November-December

1987.

Those mentioned most frequently include business (Associated Industries of
Massachusetts), local government (Massachusetts Municipal Association), labor

(AFL-CIO, Massachusetts Teachers Association,
sachusetts),

and

citizens

groups of the

left

Professional Firefighters of

Mas-

(Massachusetts Public Interest Research

Limited Taxation). On most major issues, powerbe opposed to one another, yet each of these groups has
some issues over which it is the dominant influence. A clearer picture will emerge
when we examine each type of group separately.

Group) and the

ful

groups are

right (Citizens for

likely to

Business in Massachusetts Politics
Discussion of interest groups' resources usually covers votes, money, and information.

11

Business, taken collectively, has an additional resource: without

tion, the

economy will cease

by

striking,

to

move

decision,

its

coopera-

to function. Labor, too, can bring the system to a halt

but a union strike

is

an extraordinary event.

a Massachusetts plant to a

what Charles Lindblom

new

calls

location

is

A corporation's decision

simply an everyday business

12
"the privileged position of business." Polit-
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ical

leaders must

meet the needs of the business community regardless of

their

lobbying effort. Since business leaders are also effective lobbyists, their power

is

maximized.

The

example of this privileged position came in 1975-1976. With the state
and a budget crisis, a group of large financial institutions, led by
the (then) First National Bank of Boston, declared that it would not buy any of several forthcoming state debt offerings unless several conditions were met, some of
which were economic in the narrow sense. So-called moral obligation notes had to
be replaced by those backed with the full faith and credit of the state, short-term
notes with long-term bonds, and the new bonds were sold with above-market interest rates. But other conditions were more political. In November of 1975 the banks
insisted that a "credible" state budget be passed before they would purchase $131
million in notes. The ensuing budget cut 8,000 cases from the general relief category
of welfare, reduced social service programs by $300 million, eliminated planned
cost-of-living increases for welfare clients and state workers, and raised taxes by
$350 million. 13
Legislators and aides were asked to list the groups in each of the seven categories
shown in Table 2 from which they heard most frequently. Table 4 gives the most frequently named business groups, with other information about them as reported to
the Office of the Secretary of State for 1986. However, while some specific groups
Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM), the Massachusetts
do stand out
High Technology Council, and the Business Round Table in particular
other organizations tend to blend with the broader interest in respondents' perceptions. Thus
there were six mentions by name of the Massachusetts Hospital Association (MHA),
clearest

facing a recession

—

—

but five other citations of hospitals or the health care industry. This doesn't indicate
that the

One

MHA

"Your survey

weak, but that

fails to

members who
as

is

it

has chosen an effective lobbying strategy.

state senator, dissatisfied with the survey form,

are

me very much

applied to

is

effective. If

my constituents who contact me — especially on

opposed to petition or pre-printed

influence

added a written comment:

delineate the type of lobbying which

letter

—

I listen.

groups have

a personal level

Otherwise 'groups' don't

other than local groups." Because this statement could be

many legislators,

the

MHA accordingly seeks to present

representatives of local hospitals, not just in

its

its

cause through

own name.

The group mentioned most often, AIM, is the umbrella group for Massachusetts
As such it concerns itself with the overall business climate; it seeks

manufacturing.

to lower taxes, limit regulation,

and counterbalance the influence of labor unions on

such issues as worker's compensation and plant-closing legislation. With eight paid

AIM is active and visible to legislators and their aides.

However,
on the specific concerns of such regulated industries
as health care, banking, insurance, and utilities. Groups representing each industry
are active when that industry's interests are at stake, so that the relative prominence
of any particular group is more an indication of what the legislature is doing that

legislative agents,

much

business lobbying focuses

year than of any group's inherent influence.
Professional groups, listed separately

on the survey form, might better be consid-

ered a subset of business groups. Respondents mentioned doctors (the Massachusetts

Medical Society) and lawyers (the Massachusetts Bar Association) most prominently. 14
These groups are strongest when they are defending their professional jurisdiction
against incursions by nurses or paralegals. Recently, the two groups have also con-
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fronted each other over the issue of medical malpractice, with doctors seeking to limit
liability

and lawyers upholding the sovereignty of juries. The
adding to health care inflation.

result has

been a lack of

state action, with the costs

Table 4

Business Groups Most Often Heard From
Number
Group

Number

of

Number

of

of

Legislator

Staff

Paid

Mentions

Mentions

Agents

26

16

Associated Industries of
Massachusetts
Massachusetts High Technology
Council
Business Round Table

Reported
Spending,
1986

$130,001

10

5

2

11

4

1

10
5

11

11

Massachusetts Hospital Association

6

3

20,357
3,028
134,782
68,613

Insurance Association of
Massachusetts (LIAM)*
Small business T

5
10

5
8

3

134,520

Chambers

of

Commerce*

Life

*Chambers

of

Commerce

include eight local

Chamber

of

Commerce

organizations;

LIAM includes

mentions of insurance or insurance lobby.
'

Most mentions were

to generic small business;

no one organization stood

out, although several

received a mention.

Source: Calculated from

my survey, November-December

State, Financial Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986,

Salaries

— Cross Reference.

1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of
and Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed

Organized Labor
Legislators rated labor as the
it

most powerful

interest in the state, while aides placed

in first position with business. Like business, labor possesses

back up

its

political efforts, but labor's

economic power

is

economic power

harder

difference between everyday business decisions and the rare strike or other
action by labor. Collective bargaining

is

to

to use, as in the

work

an effective means of pursuing economic

goals, but with the important exception of public employees, for

about wages and working conditions are simultaneously

political

whom decisions
and economic,

it is

difficult to use collective bargaining for political ends. Hence unions in Massachusetts
have developed sizable lobbying operations. Groups classified as unions by the Sec-

retary of State reported spending $284,548

on lobbying

activities in 1986. If

we add

the Massachusetts Teachers Association which, though classified as an education
affairs and services group, holds numerous union contracts with local school committees, the total rises to $359,928. Police
sively that the Secretary of State gives

and

them

firefighting unions lobby so inten-

their

own

category; these groups

reported spending $178,996.

Lockard and Morehouse 15 both found that Massachusetts unions were closely tied
to the Democratic Party. Despite the neoliberal tendencies of former Democratic
Governor Michael Dukakis, which made him hesitant to identify too closely with
unions, this remained true in the 1980s. Given the Democratic dominance of the legislature, unions have felt little need to seek Republican votes. However, the unions'
influence is limited by the equally significant power of business. Rather than wage
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intensive conflict for broad social change, labor in Massachusetts has generally chosen
to

narrow

result of

its

focus. In addition,

both these factors,

some unions

much

are

more

influential than others.

of labor's lobbying effort

is

As

a

devoted either to win-

ning approval for job-creating public works projects or to improvement of the pay and

On the first,

working conditions of public employees.
itself allied

with business.

On the

second,

its

labor

is

as likely as not to find

power is limited by budgetary

constraints

and opposed by antitax groups, but such opposition is normally subdued.
Table 5 shows the labor groups from which respondents reported hearing most
often. Except for the umbrella AFL-CIO, which leads the list, public employees'
unions dominate, with the AFL-CIO Building Trades Council the only other group
to receive significant mention. In recent years the AFL-CIO has pursued interests
ranging from the reform of workers' compensation to the defeat of a bottle-deposit
law. It has also worked to support the aims of the other unions listed in the table.
But despite internal pressure from its left wing, the AFL-CIO has not pursued a
broad working-class agenda. When it has done so, its efforts have met with only
limited success.

For example,
tive

Thomas

in

1984 unions endorsed a

bill

sponsored by then state representa-

Gallagher, a Boston Democrat, to protect workers from plant closings.

Basic industry in Massachusetts has been declining, and several of the state's smaller
cities

have seen the closing of factories that were the mainstay of the local economy.

Table 5

Labor Groups Most Often Heard From
Number
Group

of

Number

of

Number

Legislator

Staff

Paid

Mentions

Mentions

Agents

30

15

AFL-CIO
Massachusetts
Greater Boston

of

Reported
Spending,
1986

$67,581
24,708

Teachers
Massachusetts Teachers Association
Massachusetts Federation of Teachers
MTA and MFT

10

75,380
40,545

2
2

10

Firefighters

Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts

5,254

International Association of Firefighters,

Boston
and firefighters
5 police unions*
Police

*

1

2,400
110,133

1

8

AFL-CIO Building Trades Council

7

3

1

American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees

6

4

2

69,000

Service Employees International Union
(includes locals 254, 285, and 509)

6

5

2

36,933

3,666

Combined total for Boston Police Alliance, Boston Police Patrolman's Association, Massachusetts Police
Association, International Brotherhood of Police Officers/National Association of Government Employees, and
State Police Association of Massachusetts.
Source: Calculated from

my

November-December 1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of State, Financial
Cross Reference.
and Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed Salaries

survey,

Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986,

—

68

This industrial decline was counterbalanced during the 1980s by the growth of jobs
in the service sector and in high-technology industry, so that the statewide unemployment rate was low until the end of the decade. But even at the height of what

became known as the Massachusetts miracle, the new jobs either paid less than the
old ones or went to different people; hence members of the unskilled industrial
work force suffered, and locally depressed areas persisted even when the boom was
at

height.

its

bill would have required advance notice of layoffs on a graduated
from one month for layoffs of 50 to 99 employees to one year for layoffs of
1,000 or more. Companies that failed to give notice would have had to offer severance pay to each employee in proportion to the notice not given. It would also have
helped community-based nonprofit organizations take over the operation of closed
plants. Although the bill was cosponsored by 81 of the 160 state representatives and
11 of the 40 senators, it was blocked by the insistence of the Massachusetts High
Technology Council that its members would refuse to expand their operations in
Massachusetts if the bill passed. Rather than choose sides, Governor Dukakis called
all parties together to try to effect a compromise. After protracted negotiations, a
much weakened version of the bill was enacted, which made advance notice voluntary and provided some funds for retraining workers. Despite intense dissatisfaction
with the law as passed, Gallagher and the unions ultimately supported it as the best
they could hope to get.
Since the 1980s the AFL-CIO has tried to increase its strength by involving its
rank-and-file members. Local activists have been urged to run as delegates to state
Democratic conventions. In 1983 the unions, which had not yet endorsed a presidential candidate for the 1984 election, demonstrated their strength by asking delegates

Gallagher's

scale,

woid jobs

for a presidential straw poll taken at the state convention.
second to Walter Mondale, with 25.6 percent of the vote. While this
reaffirmed labor's importance to the party, it is difficult to trace any specific policy
to write in the

"Jobs"

came

results to

in

16

it.

Labor won a dramatic referendum victory in the 1988 general election. The Assoand Contractors (ABC), an interest group of builders who employ
nonunion workers, had placed repeal of the Massachusetts prevailing wage law on
ciated Builders

the ballot by initiative petition.

The

ABC portrayed the law as helping only highly

paid construction workers while driving up the cost of local government. The unions

might have been vulnerable to these arguments, but they defined the issue successfully as one of broad class solidarity. Most of their campaign shunned debate on the
specifics for such broad slogans as "Question 2
Bad for You" and, on a suitably
illustrated billboard, "Listen to Mama
Vote No on 2." All members of the AFLCIO Building Trades Council in Massachusetts were assessed $50 for the campaign
fund, and thousands worked the polls on Election Day. Despite one serious gaffe,
when a worker who appeared in a television advertisement was found to have made

—

—

$70,000 in the previous year, the unions
sive,

but the

new

won by

a landslide.

level of rank-and-file mobilization

The

victory

was defen-

obtained carries the possibility

of growing strength in the future. 17

As

stated above,

most labor lobbying

is

done by public employees' unions. This

understandable; since their pay and working conditions are set by elected

is

officials,

public employees are the most directly affected by political decisions. Unions repre-
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senting state employees seek to legislate pay raises and job security directly, while

those representing employees of local government seek state standards for salaries

and working conditions and

state aid to help local

government pay the

bills.

Unions

of teachers, police officers, and firefighters have been particularly effective in influ-

encing legislation. In return, they are able to deliver campaign contributions and the
votes of their

members

in the district.

Normally the

result has

been a

classic case

18
of what Theodore Lowi has called "interest group liberalism"; public employees'

unions, which press strongly for particularized benefits, are opposed only by diffuse

taxpayer resistance, so they normally win. This has often been the case in Massachusetts, but not always, as

we

shall see.

Grassroots Lobbying

and campus protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s spawned a
community organizations all across Massachusetts. Some were launched by
former campus activists seeking to broaden their base, others by local residents who
saw and admired the successes of groups elsewhere. All shared some relation to the
New Left tenet that all people have a right to participate in making those decisions
which affect their lives. These local groups developed a wide repertory of political
tactics, from civil disobedience to picketing officials' homes to mass attendance at
legislative hearings. While many such groups were unable to sustain grassroots
involvement and burned themselves out after a few years, a few have developed
funding mechanisms and membership structures that have enabled them to attain
permanence. The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, more commonly
known as MassPIRG, is a typical example.

The

civil rights

host of

MassPIRG is part of a national PIRG network, inspired by and still affiliated with
Ralph Nader. Nader's idea was that college students vote to have a per capita fee
added to their tuition bills, either as a portion of the student activities fee or as an
additional levy, and paid in a lump sum to a state PIRG, which would conduct
research and lobby in the public interest
at least as PIRG conceived it. The idea
caught on at several campuses, providing MassPIRG with a stable membership and

—

source of funds.

This official campus funding arrangement

MassPIRG uses

is

unique to the

state

PIRGs. In addi-

number of similar organizations,
the professional canvass. Full- and part-time canvassers, many of them students, are
hired on commission to go door to door, talking about PIRG's current campaigns
tion,

a technique

it

shares with a

and asking for contributions. No canvasser is likely to grow rich under this arrangemany young people find it rewarding to pick up some ready cash while

ment, but

in. The canvass produces new dues-paying
and a steady source of funds to pay the expenses of

contributing to a cause they believe

members, occasional
organizing, research,

MassPIRG

activists,

and lobbying.

has sought to represent the diffuse interests of citizens and con-

sumers, counteracting the tendency toward "interest-group liberalism" cited above.
Typical

MassPIRG

closing of nuclear

legislative goals

power

plants,

have included mail-in voter registration, the

more rigorous

testing of drinking water,

and

requiring developers to include child-care facilities in large commercial or industrial

properties. 19

70

MassPIRG, together with

a group of similar grassroots organizations, played a
development of the initiative petition as a lobbying tool. Article
48 of the amendments to the Massachusetts convention, which provides for the
right of initiative, was ratified in 1918 but had fallen into relative disuse by the early
1960s. However, the initiative has seen a revival in the last two decades. Early efforts
included unsuccessful attempts to regulate utility rates and enact a bottle-deposit
law, and a successful one to allow cities and towns to tax business property at a
higher rate than residential property. By the late 1970s, citizen-originated referenda
often dominated the otherwise uninteresting ballot in statewide elections.
Such groups as MassPIRG and Massachusetts Fair Share liked the initiative because
it not only gave them a chance to defeat better-financed interests, but also provided
the kind of organizing tactic they needed to maintain their mass membership base.
These advantages soon became apparent to another group that felt excluded from the
state's power structure, the far right. Following the well-publicized victory of the JarvisGann tax-cutting initiative, Proposition 13, in California, a group called Citizens for
Limited Taxation (CLT) launched an initiative drive to enact Proposition 2 k. This
number did not refer to the measure's position on the referendum ballot (Question 2),
but to its central provision: with certain qualifications and modifications, no city or
town would be permitted to set its property tax rate at more than 2 k percent of fair
market value.
CLT's action touched off a protracted battle. Proposition 2 k threatened the vital
interests of public employees, who feared that it would deprive local government of
the money to pay them. If that wasn't enough, it also contained provisions repealing
all state mandates for spending by local school authorities and abolishing compulsory arbitration of labor disputes involving police and fire departments. These
provisions had been important past victories of the teachers and of the police and
firefighting unions, respectively. Advocates of improved welfare, health care, and
housing also opposed Proposition 2xlz\ while their programs were state funded, they
realized that the state would have to make up some of the local governments' fiscal

central role in the

l

x

l

losses, leaving less for

other state functions.

Local governments themselves opposed the referendum almost unanimously, as
did most other elected officials. On the other side, CLT received major support from
the Massachusetts High Technology Council, from real estate interests, and less

visi-

from other business groups. Since the state's voters were to decide, both sides
had to go beyond the usual lobbying tactics. Media advertising, bumper stickers,
leafleting, and grassroots meetings burgeoned. But ultimately the chance to vote for
lower taxes proved irresistible to the electorate; Proposition 21k was enacted,

bly

1,438,768 to 998,839, in the 1980 general election.

The

initiative

and referendum process leads to the enactment of a

state statute.

Like any statute, Proposition 2 k could have been amended or repealed by the legislature. However, CLT and its charismatic leader, Barbara Anderson, were able to
l

combine grassroots pressure with lobbying to rule this out almost immediately. State
legislators and local elected officials, almost all of whom had opposed the referendum beforehand, scrambled to get back in step with their constituents by announcing that they had got the message and would try their best to make the new law
work. State aid to local government was increased, but not enough to make up for
the loss in local revenues; public employees were laid off and services cut back. The
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wore

two or three years, but the unions had learned that
and both left and right had learned that the
initiative process can be used by either side.
Both MassPIRG and CLT remain active. In 1986, CLT employed two paid agents
and reported spending $26,612 on lobbying, while MassPIRG employed eight agents
and spent $42,950. CLT is still influential but no longer succeeds in presenting itself
as the voice of the tax revolt; it never managed to develop an organized mass base
from those who voted for Proposition 2% In the survey, it was mentioned twenty
times as one of the groups most commonly heard from, but only fifteen of those who
mentioned it considered CLT a grassroots citizens group; the other five listed it as a
sense of

crisis

there were

off after

new limits on

their influence,

business group.

CLT attempted

second referendum in 1990,
Although the proposal
Question 3
was endorsed by William Weld, other Republican candidates, and
some Democrats, enough voters were not convinced that it made sense to cut taxes
in the face of a state budget deficit of half a billion dollars. The opposition used such
slogans as "It goes too far" and "I'm mad, but I'm not crazy" to separate voters' disgust with and anger at bureaucratic waste from endorsement of this specific proposal, which was defeated.
MassPIRG's condition has been more stable; while it never reached the height of
power once attained by CLT, it continues to enjoy mixed success as it tackles controversial issues. Current MassPIRG interests include control and cleanup of toxic
wastes and incentives for the use of recyclable packaging.
Environmental protection organizations in Massachusetts comprise a hybrid category. On some issues they resort to grassroots mobilization; this has been particularly true of the long battle over nuclear power and the successful effort to pass a
bottle-deposit law. But much of the environmentalists' concern has been with preserving open space and protecting the state's wetlands and coastline from destructive development. There has been grassroots involvement on these issues, too, but
the tactics have centered on education and persuasion of policymakers rather than
on mass mobilization and initiative petitions. These tactics have been fairly successful; Massachusetts now has strong coastal zone management and wetlands protection laws. In part, this success may have come more easily because the protected
areas are in towns inhabited by the state's social elite. Success in cleaning up Boston
Harbor, where untreated sewage washes up on beaches used by the working class,
has been harder to come by.
this

to regain

its

earlier status with a

time calling for a cut in the state income tax

—

rate.

—

The Catholic Church
In 1958

Duane Lockard

declared that "a good deal of foolishness has been written

about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Democratic party in
Massachusetts." 20
staff were nearly

Much

of this foolishness

unanimous

is still

in rating religious

groups included. The Catholic church does

believed, yet survey legislators

and

groups as the least influential of the

try to influence politics and legislation,
do Protestant churches to a lesser extent. Twenty-two legislators mentioned the
Catholic church, and thirteen named the Massachusetts Council of Churches (MCC)
among the religious groups most commonly heard from. Eleven aides also mentioned
the Catholic church, the only group cited more than three times. 21 But only three

as
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respondents considered "religious groups" to have "a great deal" of influence on leg-

Moreover, the Catholic church has not been very successful in battles over
have been restricting abortions, gaining state financial
support for parochial schools, reducing access to birth control information, and preventing use of the death penalty. It has been successful only on the last issue, on
which it has been joined by the liberal groups that have opposed it on the first three.
islation.

policy. Its highest priorities

However, the church has won more often
have come

in the courts, in the executive

in the legislature itself; its final defeats

branch, or from the voters. Abortion policy

provides a good example. While the right of a pregnant
is

to

woman

to have

an abortion

protected by the U.S. Constitution and the federal courts, states are not required

pay for abortions through the Medicaid program, and no federal matching funds
The Massachusetts legislature

are provided to states that choose to pay for them.

voted in 1979 not to pay for abortions with state funds, either for Medicaid patients
or for state employees. This law was revoked by the state's Supreme Judicial Court,
which found it to be unconstitutionally discriminatory against women, and the state
resumed paying for abortions.
Antiabortion forces, including the Catholic church, then sought to amend the
state constitution. Amendments must be approved by two successive biennial legislatures, which meet in joint session as Constitutional Conventions (ConCons)
for this purpose, and then submitted to the voters at the next general election.
Advocates of abortion rights were able to slow down but not halt passage of the
amendment by the ConCon. In 1986, a question on the ballot proposed amending

the constitution to "allow the legislature to prohibit or regulate abortions to the

extent permitted by the United States Constitution," except for "abortions

required to prevent the death of the mother." The ensuing referendum campaign
particularly close; the proposed amendment was defeated
by a 42 percent to 58 percent margin. 22 It was a bad election for the Catholic
church as a second proposed amendment, to permit state aid to religious and
other private elementary and secondary schools, was defeated even more badly,
30 percent to 70 percent.

was hard fought but not

These events show that the Catholic church does not control Massachusetts,
Is the low influence reported

but they do raise a question abut the survey results.

for religious groups inconsistent with the success of the Catholic church in the

on these two issues? While the available evidence does not allow a
I do not believe that the legislators and aides were responding
dishonestly. Rather, many legislators are personally opposed to the right to abortion. While many of them are Catholics and see their position as part of their
Catholic beliefs, they also see it as coming from within, from their own conscience, rather than from without, from pressure by church leaders. While we
cannot tell what would happen in the unlikely event that the church were to
change its official position, members believe that they are not responding to
influence when they vote on abortion.
This interpretation is reinforced by the knowledge that the Catholic church as
an organization does not represent the views of its members. While the church has

legislature

definitive answer,

made

opposition to abortion rights the centerpiece of

surveys have consistently
side.

tion

shown

its

political

program, opinion

that a majority of Catholic voters are

This has been reflected in the church's inability to deliver votes.

amendment

lost in

every county in the state, but
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came

on the other

The

antiabor-

closest in Berkshire
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And when the archbishop of Boston called on
Congressmen Barney Frank and James Shannon in

County, one of the most Protestant.
the faithful to vote against U.S.
1982, both

won

the election.

Women in Politics
In 1987

women made up 52.4 percent

of the population of Massachusetts, but only

House of Representatives and

15 percent of the state Senate. There
no women in the state's congressional delegation. 23 Evelyn Murphy,
lieutenant governor from 1987 to 1990, was the first woman to hold statewide elected
office. While seeking to increase the number of women in politics, feminists have also
sought to compensate for their underrepresentation through lobbying efforts.
Survey respondents ranked women's groups one step from the bottom in frequency
of contact and influence on legislation. They were ranked somewhat higher in influence on the respondent's own vote, but even here were only fourth. But while legislators of both genders concur in assigning women's groups less than average influence
on the outcome of legislation, these groups are more often heard from and given a
better reception by women legislators than by their male colleagues (Table 6).
No doubt the selective lobbying of the most receptive representatives is a necessity,
given the resource constraints faced by women's groups. Of the four women's organizations mentioned most frequently by respondents, only the National Organization
for Women (NOW) reported spending any money at all on lobbying
a total of
with one paid agent. The League of Women Voters, Mass. Choice, and the
$6,093
Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus each received at least ten mentions, but did
not register as lobbying organizations; presumably they rely on their members' volun-

19 percent of the

are currently

—

—

teer efforts.

24

Despite their shortage of money, women's groups have had some success. Massachusetts has ratified the Equal Rights

ment

to

its

own

constitution.

Amendment and adopted a similar amendalso won passage of a bill to

The women's lobby has

Table 6

Mean Ratings

of Women's Groups by
Legislators and All Legislators
Massachusetts Legislature, 1987

Women

Mean

Women
(n

Rating by
Legislators

=

12)

Mean

Rating by

All Legislators

(n

-

38)

Groups most often heard from
(on a scale of
1 = never to
5 = very frequently)

Influence on

own

vote

3.83

3.29

3.92

3.26

2.92

2.89

Influence on outcome of legislation
(on a scale of
1

5

= none to
= a great deal)

Source: Calculated from

my survey, November-December
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1987.

change sentencing practices to make the laws against rape more enforceable and
various measures to improve the enforcement of child support orders.

The

feminist

problems of battered women
and forced the removal or censure of some judges who have been notably insensitive
on this issue.
But women's groups have met with markedly less success on issues that require
spending money. Every year a broad coalition of women's groups, social service
agencies, and welfare advocates launches the latest round in the Up to Poverty campaign, seeking to bring the income of AFDC recipients up to the official poverty
level; but every year the shortfall between benefits and the poverty line increases.
The Up to Poverty coalition is unable to overcome the constraints imposed on the
budget by those who support other spending programs or oppose higher taxes.

movement

has done

much

to increase awareness of the

Massachusetts Lobbyists

As

interest groups

grow more important, so do

lobbyists.

Lobbying

is

a growth

industry in Massachusetts. In 1984, registered lobbying groups reported spending
just

under $5

million.

By

for 1987 are expected to

1986, the total had reached $8.9 million, and
approach $10 million. 25

Lobbyists are composed of

many

types.

Some

final figures

are retired politicians, like former

Senate president Kevin Harrington, whose six-foot-six figure can often be seen

around the State House. Harrington reported lobbying income of $123,015 in 1986
and $199,336 in 1987 from sources including insurance interests, the Shell Oil Com26
pany, and the Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute. Some are professional
lobbyists who have worked their way up through their skill and contacts. A good
example is William R. Delaney, a retired police officer who launched a lobbying
firm, Delaney Associates, in 1980. In 1987 the firm earned $593,288 from twentyone business clients. Delaney learned his skills as president of the Metropolitan
Police Patrolmen's Union in the early 1970s, then decided to go into business for
27
himself. But Delaney's success has not been unmixed; early in 1988 he was indicted
28
for having failed to file state income tax returns for the years 1982-1984.
Harrington and Delaney fit the traditional picture of the lobbyist who works for
well-heeled special interests. Old-style lobbyists, aware of the high centralization
of power in the Massachusetts General Court, cultivated personal relationships
with the House speaker, the Senate president, and a few other key legislators.
of their work was done over a drink at the Golden Dome pub across the
from the State House, over lunch at Anthony's Pier 4 Restaurant on the
Boston waterfront, or during conversations in the private offices of the leaders.
Campaign contributions, along with occasional bribes, were a major source of
influence, but knowledgeable intermediaries were needed to direct the money to
the right place while avoiding scandal. Therefore the ideal lobbyists were either
former legislators or others who had built up networks of personal friendship with

Much
street

legislators over the years.

Lobbying of this sort was effective, but limited to those who could afford it.
it was based on money, it was most useful for business interests. Labor unions
employed similar tactics and were successful at gaining limited objectives. Unions of
state employees seeking legislated pay increases and construction unions seeking
public works projects were particularly prominent in their use of lobbyists.
Since
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During the 1970s and 1980s a new, more populist style of lobbying developed.
Judy Meredith is a good example. She began as a community activist, found that she
enjoyed lobbying, and decided to go professional. In 1986 she reported earnings of
$59,200 from such groups as the Council of Human Service Providers, the Coalition
to License Acupuncturists, and Greater Boston Legal Services; in 1987 she earned
29
$63,000, including $16,000 from the city of Boston. Meredith and other lobbyists of
this type found that they could replace the power of money with the power of votes.

They put more of their energy
about issues and

legislative

their constituents are

into educating their

own

client groups'

procedures and finding ways to

watching

how

they vote.

One

such tactic

is

supporters of a cause from around the state gather at the State
their representatives

These new
politics.

tactics

and senators. 30
have helped change the

style

membership

let legislators

know that
when

the lobby day,

House

to

meet with

of Massachusetts interest-group

Today, even business-oriented lobbyists find that

it

helps to demonstrate

grassroots support for their cause, as with the Massachusetts Hospital Association

campaign described

at the

beginning of

this article. Nevertheless,

money

is still

and more and more of it is funneled through political
action committees (PACs). Although 1987 was not an election year, the ten largest

vastly important in lobbying,

PACs

members of the

contributed $271,763 to

state legislature, a

64 percent increase

over their contributions in the previous nonelection year. 31 Each of the top ten

PACs

represented an industry or a labor union, most with important legislative goals that
year, as

shown

in Table 7.

32

Table 7

Contributions and Legislative Goals of
Ten Largest Political Action Committees
Massachusetts Legislature, 1987
Amount

Legislative

PAC

Result

Interest

Massachusetts Realtors
Painters District Council

#35

Contributed

Defeat land bank

bill

Success

$56,361

Retain prevailing

wage law

Success

42,865

Massachusetts Bankers State Fund

Cut tax on banks

Pending

32,750

Bay State Physicians

Defeat universal health care

Success

29,097

Beer Distributors

General influence

Massachusetts DEAC
(new car dealers)

to

Massachusetts Mutual

Life

—

24,700

Extend consumer protection
used car buyers

Success

24,250

Defeat universal health care

Success

17,940

Success

17,250

Mixed

14,050

Mixed

12,500

Insurance Administrators

Sheet Metal Workers #17

Retain prevailing

Committee

Further

to Elect Responsible

utility

wage law

interests

Public Officials

Service Employees International

Further interests of public

Union 254

employees

Source: Adapted from Peter

B.

Sleeper,

"PACs Spend

Lavishly, Effectively,"
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Boston Globe, January 31, 1988, 27.

and growing business in Massachusetts. The number of regisrise, as do interest-group spending and campaign contributions. Until the 1990 election, Massachusetts seemed to be growing increasingly similar
to a traditional one-party state, with the Democrats holding a dominant electoral posiInterest groups are a big

tered lobbyists continues to

tion but

little

or no coherence on policy issues.

allowed interest groups to grow

in

As

one-party South, this

in the old

importance as the organizing force

in

policymaking.

But Massachusetts differs from those one -party states in having strong labor
unions, environmental organizations, women's groups, and such grassroots groups
as MassPIRG. These interests are not strong enough, singly or collectively, to overcome the economic weight and political power of the state's businesses, but they are
strong enough to prevent the development of the kind of single-interest business
dominance common in the Old South and West. Moreover, there are important divisions within the business community; for example, the huge health care industry
depends on third-party payments, which are financed through taxes and premiums
assessed in part on other industries. Such divisions further act to prevent singleinterest dominance. The situation in Massachusetts might thus be better characterized as one of interest-centered conflict rather than interest-group dominance.
Recent events suggest that party competition may return. The Republican Party
made a significant comeback in the 1990 election, winning the governorship and the
treasurer's office and doubling the size of its state Senate bloc. Governor William
Weld is a Republican very much in the mold of John Volpe and Francis Sargent whose
victory would have done no more than theirs did to change the balance of party
strength; but the Republican legislative gains may have more lasting importance. The
Republican State Committee, which in the last few elections had run talented neophytes for Congress (and seen them obliterated) while virtually ignoring the state legislature, reversed its strategy; it made a strong effort to find legislative candidates, and
the party gained seats as a result.

It

also

made

a serious effort to shed

its

previous

antiabortion label; Weld, Cellucci, and several successful Republican legislative candi-

dates in 1990 took strong positions in favor of the right to reproductive choice.
If

the Republicans can sustain their efforts for the next few elections,

Mas-

have a real two-party system. 33 If this happens, it may lead
the Democratic Party to gain more policy coherence as well; some interest groups

sachusetts

may then

may come

to

Labor unions, citizens'
High
Technology
Council already
and the Massachusetts
show signs of partisan sympathy. However, environmentalist groups, women's
groups, and other business groups
particularly the life insurance and health care
interests, but also AIM
seem determined to work with members of both parties.
find themselves forced into partisan coalitions.

groups of the

left

and

right,

—

—

Unless the parties unify themselves much more strongly than they have to date,
these groups will probably succeed in remaining neutral. The next few years will
hold great interest for students of Massachusetts
This article

Groups

is

politics.

£*

based on research done for my chapter, "Citizen Power, Corporate Power: Interest

in Massachusetts, " in

Ronald Hrebenar and Clive Thomas,
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